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Creators/Authors contains: "Kaziakhmedov, Edgar"

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  1. Understanding the mechanisms that lead to false alarms (erro- neously detecting cover images as containing secrets) in steganaly- sis is a topic of utmost importance for practical applications. In this paper, we present evidence that a relatively small number of pixel outliers introduced by the image acquisition process can skew the soft output of a data driven detector to produce a strong false alarm. To verify this hypothesis, for a cover image we estimate a statistical model of the acquisition noise in the developed domain and identify pixels that contribute the most to the associated likelihood ratio test (LRT) for steganography. We call such cover elements LIEs (Locally Infuential Elements). The efect of LIEs on the output of a data-driven detector is demonstrated by turning a strong false alarm into a correctly classifed cover by introducing a relatively small number of “de-embedding” changes at LIEs. Similarly, we show that it is possible to introduce a small number of LIEs into a strong cover to make a data driven detector classify it as stego. Our fndings are supported by experiments on two datasets with three steganographic algorithms and four types of data driven detectors. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 17, 2026
  2. In batch steganography, the sender communicates a secret message by hiding it in a bag of cover objects. The adversary performs the so-called pooled steganalysis in that she inspects the entire bag to detect the presence of secrets. This is typically realized by using a detector trained to de- tect secrets within a single object, applying it to all objects in the bag, and feeding the detector outputs to a pooling function to obtain the final detection statistic. This paper deals with the problem of building the pooler while keep- ing in mind that the Warden will need to be able to de- tect steganography in variable size bags carrying variable payload. We propose a flexible machine learning solution to this challenge in the form of a Transformer Encoder Pooler, which is easily trained to be agnostic to the bag size and payload and offers a better detection accuracy than pre- viously proposed poolers. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available February 2, 2026